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Abstract
Determining policy priorities is a challenging task for any government because there may be,
for example, a multiplicity of objectives to be simultaneously attained, a multidimensional policy
space to be explored, inefficiencies in the implementation of public policies, interdependencies be-
tween policy issues, etc. Altogether, these factors generate a complex landscape that governments
need to navigate in order to reach their goals. To address this problem, we develop a framework
to model the evolution of development indicators as a political economy game on a network. Our
approach accounts for the –recently documented– network of spillovers between policy issues, as
well as the well-known political economy problem arising from budget assignment. This allows
us to infer not only policy priorities, but also the effective use of resources in each policy issue.
Using development indicators data from more than 100 countries over 11 years, we show that the
country-specific context is a central determinant of the effectiveness of policy priorities. In ad-
dition, our model explains well-known aggregate facts about the relationship between corruption
and development. Finally, this framework provides a new analytic tool to generate bespoke advice
on development strategies.
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1. Introduction
Throughout the process of economic development, governments prioritize public policies with
the aim of reaching specific targets. Such targets may be motivated by internal political agree-
ments, by imitating successful countries or by a broad international consensus (best practices),
among other reasons. Whichever the case, the task of effectively prioritizing policies can be
daunting, on one hand, due to inefficiencies (such as corruption) in the implementation process
and, on the other, because dealing with a large set of policy goals is not trivial. For example, the
recent transition to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) implies that governments should
increase their policy spectrum to cover 169 targets as opposed to 18 from the Millennium Project.
Moreover, governments have to consider 232 indicators about the relevant policy issues, instead
of the 48 previously used [General Assembly, 2017].
Leaving aside well-known measurement and data-generation problems, one of the biggest chal-
lenges in reaching development goals is accounting for the interdependency between policy issues
[Nilsson et al., 2016] (see Pradhan et al. [2017] for a survey). For example, schooling is likely
to exert positive effects on labor markets, so depending on how governments prioritize and coor-
dinate policies, the allocated resources may become complementary or redundant. Furthermore,
the policy-issue relationship structure may vary considerably from one country to another. For
instance, health policies can have a widespread impact on the socioeconomic indicators of a poor
country like Haiti, given the fact that human capital is not a generalized asset in its population. As
Nilsson et al. [2016] put it: “Implicit in the SDG logic is that the goals depend on each other –
but no one has specified exactly how”. Some attempts have been made to characterize SDGs as
networks of pairwise correlations [Le Blanc, 2015]. However, it is not obvious how to move from
correlations to causal relationships. Even more important, it is not clear how to use such networks
for prescriptive purposes without running into well-known limitation of conventional statistical
models (see section 2).
We propose to think about such interdependencies in terms of positive spillover effects between
development indicators.1 In this network, each node represents a policy issue, and an edge flow-
1The literature on pairwise correlations between SDGs [Nilsson et al., 2016, Pradhan et al., 2017] also considers
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ing from one node to another symbolizes a spillover from the former to the latter. This network
structure can be unique to a particular economy, resulting in a distinctive allocation of resources
across the same policy issues that other countries face. Thus, a set of policies that work for a
country may be ineffective in another. In addition, there are political-economy considerations that
central authorities need to address when allocating resources to different government offices. For
instance, in face of imperfect supervision, positive network effects can mask the incompetence of
government officials. Even more preoccupying, these situations may elicit incentives to divert pub-
lic funds for private gains. Together, these mechanisms shape the development strategies observed
throughout the world; therefore, building a framework to understand them is paramount. Ideally
such a framework could be used to shed some light on the complex process by which countries
prioritize public policies and to provide some advice to governments who wish to reach specific
targets.
In this paper, we appeal to ideas and tools from behavioral economics and network science in
order to develop a new approach to the problem of formulating policy priorities, and to provide a
policy-guiding tool. The method builds on a model where a central government assigns resources
to different officials who, in the end, decide how much of these resources they will actually use
for their original purpose. Three distinctive features define this model: 1) a country-specific net-
work of spillovers (interdependencies) between policy issues; 2) political economy considerations
that differentiate policy design from implementation; and 3) a central authority that –through a
behavioral game– achieves development targets by allocating resources while, in parallel, its func-
tionaries learn how much corruption can pass undetected.2
The proposed model allows inferring policy priorities from observed indicators, and to eval-
uate their suitability for reaching specific targets. With that aim in mind, we consider that, as
countries evolve, they leave behind a ‘development footprint’ reflected in their policy indicators.
That is, developing countries may use as guides those policies that advanced nations implemented
negative relationships. Here, we focus on positive ones because they have a natural economic interpretation in terms
of public policy and in simulating the growth of development indicators. Future extensions might consider negative
spillovers as well.
2Generally speaking, one can think of inefficiencies in the implementation process. However, in the context
of developing countries, the concept of corruption, understood as the diversion of public funds, is highly salient.
Therefore, in this paper, we adopt this concept.
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to achieve their current stage of development. In fact, in the study of structural transformations in
developing countries, a step-wise development process in which nations follow successful cases is
indeed observed [Akamatsu, 1962].
The rest of the paper has the following structure. In section 2, we review the literature related
to the problem under consideration, and make some comments with regard to the limitations of
alternative methodologies. Section 3 introduces the theoretical model and provides a brief compu-
tational analysis. In section 4 we describe the data, its normalization and how the spillover network
is estimated. Section 5 presents different tests for the external validation of the model using infor-
mation from 117 countries. Then, in section 6, we perform internal validation tests, analyzing the
outcomes’ sensitivity to the model’s components (or social mechanisms). Next, section 7 presents
retrospective and prospective analyses for the countries included in the sample. The former allows
us to infer the policy priorities that these nations employed throughout the last decade. The latter
allows identifying the policy priorities that emerge when following the development footprints of
more advanced nations. Finally, we conclude in section 8 with a summary of the empirical results
of the model, and provide suggestions for future extensions.
2. Related literature and alternative methodologies
The literature studying how a set of policies impacts the economic development of a region
(e.g., country, state or municipality) offers different methodological approaches. In this review, we
compare three that are frequently considered and one that is closer to ours: econometric analyses,
benchmark studies, growth diagnostics and interdependency networks. In particular, we focus our
discussion on their main limitations and how our framework can help overcoming them.
2.1. Regression analyses
Most econometric-based studies concentrate on linear-regression analysis. A direct implica-
tion of considering linear relationships is the implicit assumption of substitutability between public
policies. This, in turn, prevents any policy issue from being identified as a binding constraint to
the dependent variable (often GDP growth).3 Hence, the statistical and economic significance of
3In order to consider parameter heterogeneity, regression-based approaches may employ more sophisticated tech-
niques such as including thresholds in the fitted specifications [Minier, 2007], quantile regressions [Canarella and Pol-
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any ‘independent variable’ justifies the use of the associated policy. Another problem arises from
estimating average effects. For example, when consultants base their policy advise on these tools,
they ‘forget’ that the relationships between the dependent and the independent variables corre-
spond to a hypothetical country with the average characteristics of the data set at hand. Therefore,
a country-specific analysis is out of the question. Furthermore, the Rodrik’s critique suggests that
policies are not random variables, but conscious and strategic decisions made by governments;
hence, cross-national data would hardly provide enough variation to assess the relevance of spe-
cific public policies in a particular country [Rodrik, 2012]. Finally, it is often the case that policy
targets arise from international consensus. Therefore short-term cross-national observations are
unlikely independent.
2.2. Benchmark studies
Consultants and technocrats tend to articulate their policy advice on issues related to socioe-
conomic development (e.g., competitiveness, social development, growth, well-being, etc.) by
means of benchmark comparisons. For this purpose, they make use of a large set of indicators
that describe different realities in the national or international level [Rondo-Brovetto and Saliterer,
2007, Huggins, 2010]. By analyzing these indicators in isolation, they establish the minimum
standards that laggard regions should attempt to achieve in a subset of selected policies. There
are many reasons why this common practice usually leads to erroneous inferences and misleading
advice; here we mention a few. First, the absence of a theoretical support does not help to specify
how policy priorities should be formulated. Second, there is a high degree of arbitrariness on how
the recommended policies should be chosen. Third, this simplistic approach does not take into
account the non-linearity and interdependence of public policies. Fourth, this method is unable to
evaluate the effectiveness of the recommended public policies.
lard, 2004], estimation of non-linear dependencies through the Generalized Additive Mixed Model, GAMM [Wood,
2006], or pooling countries into different groups in order to limit the degree of substitutability between public policies
[Lee and Kim, 2009]. These practices, however, are problematic for scaling the number of variables, and give place
to numerous specifications. Hence model selection becomes an issue that requires additional methodologies [Vuong,
1989, Doornik and Hendry, 2015]. A similar problem arises when choosing models with interactive terms.
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2.3. Growth diagnostics
The growth diagnostics approach aims at identifying the key policy interventions that can ignite
growth in a particular region during a specific period [Hausmann et al., 2005, 2008, Rodrik, 2009,
2010]. It is based on the idea that prices and shadow prices of specific factors (e.g., finance, educa-
tion, infrastructure and governance institutions) reflect the scarcity of resources. Consequently, it
is designed to discover critical bottlenecks in the economy under study. As pointed by Aghion and
Durlauf [2009] and Felipe and Usui [2008], one of the limitations of growth diagnostics lies in the
difficulty of determining a comprehensive list of policy priorities. On one hand, the requirement of
expert knowledge in each policy issue makes scalability inviable (i.e., the more indicators the least
feasible to implement the analysis). On the other, if distorted prices do not allow identifying bind-
ing constraints, a non-price signal has to be assessed (e.g., informal activities). Other limitations
include arbitrariness when selecting policy issues and a unidimensional view of policy objectives
that focuses solely on GDP growth [Habermann and Padrutt, 2011].
2.4. Interdependency networks
The literature on interdependency networks focuses on the interactions between policy issues.
The most popular approach uses Bayesian networks to infer how improvements in specific socioe-
conomic indicators affect policy targets. This is achieved by estimating the network structure of
probabilistic dependencies between targets and treated variables [Czyz˙ewska and Mroczek, 2014,
Ceriani and Gigliarano, 2016, Cinicioglu et al., 2017]. Besides offering intuitive network visu-
alizations, this methodology allows researchers to infer which policies are the most effective to
influence a particular target (i.e., diagnostic analysis), as well as assessing the impact of a particu-
lar policy issue on any indicator (i.e., predictive analysis).
The Bayesian approach described above has, however, several drawbacks. First, similar repli-
cates (i.e., pooled data of “similar” countries) are required for the estimation procedure to be
feasible because the available time series are usually short for a given country. Thus, when cal-
culating marginal probabilities, this framework is applicable only to sets of countries with an
assumed structural similarity. For this reason, it is not possible (at least not with today’s available
data sets) to analyze countries on a case-by-case basis. Second, this approach makes no attempt
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to estimate causal relationships and, thus, any interpretation has to be solely expressed in terms of
structural dependencies. Third, the data analysis is not backed by economic theory, which makes
it a predictive method rather than a policy/prescriptive tool.
Another line of research, based on the idea of building a set of interdependent policies, was de-
veloped by Castan˜eda et al. [2017], who take a machine learning approach. Here, ‘policy efforts’
are considered the exogenous components of the different development indicators. The authors
estimate these efforts through a genetic algorithm that minimizes the distance between previously
specified development goals and simulated outcomes (reflected in the level of the associated indi-
cators). The network becomes relevant by allowing spillover effects between policy efforts. The
data analysis from this approach, however, lacks a theoretical backbone and suffers from scaling
constraints. That is, the larger the set of policy issues, the higher is the dimension of the ‘chromo-
some of efforts’ that needs to be estimated.
2.5. Advantages of the proposed methodology
By means of a behavioral game on a network of policy issues, our method helps to address
some of the limitations described above. First, it can handle a very large set of variables (i.e., it is
scalable). Second, it accounts for the complex structure of linkages among development indicators
(i.e., it does not assume independence between covariates). Third, because it is built on explicit
causal/social mechanisms, it is possible to infer how public resources are allocated and diverted
(i.e., it allows internal validation). Fourth, it helps us to clarify how the initial conditions, targets
and the country’s context matter for policymaking (i.e., it produces country-specific estimations).
Fifth, it can be used to establish policy guidelines for any particular country when a government
establishes a new set of goals (i.e., it is helpful for policy design).4
Clearly, one of the biggest advantages of the proposed method is the ability to account for con-
text specificity. The importance of context is particularly salient in the empirical literature, where
there is significant evidence showing that countries with similar policy interventions produce very
different outcomes [Rodrik, 2009, Lee and Kim, 2009]. For instance, improving health and phys-
4Although, we do not compute marginal effects for each public issue in this paper, as it is traditionally done in
growth regressions, this is possible by running simulations with ‘deactivated’ policies.
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ical infrastructure might be more helpful in lower-income countries than in upper-middle-income
ones, while the latter might get more benefit out of public governance and R&D public policies.
This has led many development economists to advocate policymaking based on the identification
of the country’s binding constraints of growth.
3. Behavioral game and computational implementation
The output of our model is the simulated evolution of different indicators through the learning
process that countries experience as policies are prioritized and implemented. These dynamics
are driven by two types of agents: a central authority (or government) and public servants (or
functionaries). On one hand, the government allocates resources to different public policies, with
the aim of improving the indicators associated to their respective policy issues. On the other,
functionaries are in charge of implementing these public policies and, thus, they have incentives
to divert public funds for personal gain. Therefore, the incentives of government and bureaucrats
are misaligned, giving place to a principal–agent problem.5 Furthermore, the interdependency
between policy issues encourages free-riding. This is so because positive spillovers mask the real
performance of public servants. In this section, we formalize this behavioral game and implement
it computationally by means of an agent-based model (ABM).
The behavioral game can be described as a political economy game between the central au-
thority and all public functionaries who have the mandate of implementing policies. Nevertheless,
this game has a public-goods flavor since the diversion of funds may have multiplicative adverse
effects in societal welfare.6 This is due to the fact that smaller spillovers reduce the size of the
pie. The intricate interaction between spillovers, diversion of funds, detection of corruption and
resource allocation obfuscates the incentive structure of the game; rendering rational modelling
inappropriate. Therefore, a more cognitively-viable specification demands learning-driven behav-
ior where agents adapt to new and limited information via heuristics that are commonly found in
laboratory experiments. In order to formalize such heuristics, we employ agent-computing. In
5Note that we do not assume a benevolent government. For instance, the central authority may try to achieve a set
of targets that are in conflict with social welfare.
6Our behavioral game does not have the traditional structure of a public goods game, as it considers two types of
agents, and initial resources are not assigned exogenously.
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the literature of behavioral games, agent-computing has become extremely useful to discriminate
among competing explanations of experimental outcomes. This is so because artificial games
allow controlling for characteristics that are not easy to isolate in real experiments (e.g., learn-
ing, strategic signaling, types of social preferences and interaction networks) [Janssen and Ahn,
2006].7
3.1. Dynamics of development indicators
There are N policy issues, each with an indicator that measures its level of development. The
level of an indicator depends on how much of the government’s allocated resource is effectively
utilized in the corresponding public policy. That is, for an amount of resource Pi ∈ [0, 1] allocated
to policy issue i, the public servant in charge uses Ci ∈ [0, Pi] effectively in such policy. We call
Ci the contribution of the official. Then, Pi − Ci is the amount of public funds that this individual
diverts for a personal gain. We refer to this gap as corruption.8 In addition to the contribution of the
functionary, the level of i’s indicator also depends on the public policies of other officials through
spillover effects. We model these interdependencies as a network. This network is represented by
the adjacency matrix A, where Ai j > 0 if there are spillovers from i to j, and Ai j = 0 otherwise
(the first index denotes rows and the second columns).
Consequently, an indicator is the result of the official’s contribution and the spillovers from
the contributions of other functionaries. As the government invests in a policy issue, its indicator
grows, i.e., the investment accumulates. This means that, if the government has set a target Ti for
policy issue i, then indicator Ii will reach Ti after ` periods of investment.9 Hence, the dynamics
7Three exemplary studies in the application of ABMs are particularly relevant in the context of public goods
games: [Bayer et al., 2009, Lucas et al., 2014, Reddy and Petrie, 2015]. Examples of ABMs analyzing collective
action games can be found in Deadman [1999], Sarin and Vahid [2004], Castillo and Saysel [2005], Hichri and Kirman
[2007], Ruttan [2008], Chmura et al. [2012], Arifovic and Ledyard [2011], Greiff [2013], Nax and Perc [2015], Ezaki
et al. [2016].
8The interpretation of the Pi −Ci gap is, in fact, broader than the idea of corruption. One can think of this gap, for
instance, in terms of inefficiencies, since the public servant benefits from shirking and devoting work time to personal
activities. For example, an official may prefer to directly adjudicate a government contract to a firm he or she already
knows, instead of conducting a proper bidding process –which would imply more work to him or her. In this example,
Pi −Ci would represent a loss in efficiency by not hiring the best firm.
9In this model, a period represents the realization of some events. For example, achieving a target in ` periods
means that the government had to experience ` events of budget reallocation. A larger ` implies that reaching the
target was more difficult. Therefore, ` should not be interpreted in terms of time units.
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describing the convergence of Ii toward its target is given by
Ii,t = Ii,t−1 + γ(Ti − Ii,t−1)
Ci,t + ∑
j
C j,tA ji
 , (1)
where A ji is the amount of spillovers from j to i, Aii = 0 and Ti − Ii,t−1 regulates the velocity of the
change in order to reach convergence. Parameter γ captures the impact of the effective resources.
A simpler version of the model assumes γ = 1. However, calibrating γ is useful to exploit the
cross-national variation in order to perform aggregate inference.
In this political economy game, the central authority and the public servants solve different
problems with limited information. Hence, we model their behaviors mathematically through
an adaptive heuristic and directional learning respectively. Then, we describe the computational
implementation of the game, and demonstrate its dynamics with an illustrative simulation.
3.2. Public servants
We simplify the model by assuming that a government official is in charge of implementing
each public policy. Although, we can also think about this agent as an entire office (agency or
ministry) that acts through collective behavior. The official’s contribution Ci,t to the implementa-
tion of a public policy depends on how costly it is to divert resources for personal gain. In terms
of benefits, the level of the corresponding indicator gives the public servant political status. This,
of course, does not depend only on his or her contribution, but also on the spillovers from other
policies, (i.e., the contributions of other public servants). The bureaucrat, however, has limited
information because he or she cannot directly observe the spillovers (i.e., he or she does not know
the network). Instead, the agent evaluates the change in his or her benefits Fi. Depending on the
evolution of these benefits, the functionary determines its contribution eaach period. First, let us
define the benefit function of public servants as
Fi,t = (Ii,t + Pi,t −Ci,t)(1 − θi,t fR,t), (2)
where θi,t is an indicator function derived from the supervision of the central authority, and fR,t is
a function mapping the indicator corresponding to the rule of law to a probability. Thus, when the
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product of these two functions is close to one, the functionary’s benefits vanish.
The government cannot measure the real contribution of its public servants, so Pi,t −Ci,t is not
directly observable. However, society generates signals that the central authority might pick up in
order to increase supervision efforts in specific policy issues. We assume that the strength of these
signals is proportional to the amount of diverted public funds Pi,t −Ci,t. This means that the larger
the level of corruption, the more difficult it is to hide, which may cause journalists to uncover them
and expose corruption scandals, for example. Therefore, even if the government cannot directly
observe the functionaries’ contributions, it can target supervision efforts through informed guesses.
We model this supervision as a random variable θi,t. The outcome of this variable is 1 if the public
servant in policy issue i is caught diverting public funds, and zero otherwise. Then, the probability
mass function of θi in period t is
θi,t =

1 with probability fC,t
(Pi,t−Ci,t)∑N
j=1(P j,t−C j,t)
,
0 with probability 1 − fC,t (Pi,t−Ci,t)∑N
j=1(P j,t−C j,t)
,
(3)
where fC,t maps the indicator corresponding to the control of corruption to a probability.
Equation 3 implies that officials extracting larger rents are more likely to be caught. Another
implication is that small-time corruption, is less likely to be detected. This makes it pervasive
and highly unlikely to be eradicated, especially if the country’s mechanisms for the control of
corruption are weak.
Note that we introduced two mechanisms through which countries try to mitigate corruption:
the rule of law ( fR,t) and the quality of monitoring efforts ( fC,t). On one hand, fC,t captures the ef-
forts from the central authority to detect corrupt officials. On the other, fR,t reflects the effectiveness
of the state in prosecuting officials who are involved in illicit activities. These two mechanisms
describe different constraints that governments face when fighting corruption. For example, in
several countries, it is often the case that the central authority improves its methods for monitoring
corruption. However, such improvements do not reduce corruption because an ineffective judicial
system allows impunity to flourish.10 This is captured by the interaction θi,t fR,t, where a corrupt
10Note that the model does not assume an ‘honest’ government. In real life, deficient prosecutions are also the result
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official i might receive a negligible punishment despite being caught diverting funds.
To be more specific, fR,t and fC,t take the form
fX,t =
IX,t
e1−IX,t
, (4)
where X = R for the rule of law or X = C for control of corruption.
Once we have defined the benefits of the functionaries, we introduce a learning mechanism in-
spired in Carrella [2014], who applies PID controllers to model firms facing unknown demands.11
Then, the public servant updates his or her contribution according to
Ci,t = min
{
Pi,t,max
(
0,Ci,t−1 + di,t|∆Fi,t|Ci,t−1 + Ci,t−22
)}
. (5)
Let us explain equation 5 in detail by first focusing on the non-zero element inside the round
brackets. The first summand is the contribution from the previous step. The second addend de-
pends on the magnitude of the change in the official’s benefits |∆Fi,t|. Factor di,t is a sign function
indicating the direction in which the change of the contribution will go, as suggested by Bayer
et al. [2009]. For this, the public servant evaluates the difference between his or her past contribu-
tions Ci,t−1 and Ci,t−2, and the difference between his or her past benefits Fi,t−1 and Fi,t−2. Incentives
to increase the level of the contribution arise from this information. For example, if Ci,t−1 > Ci,t−2
and Fi,t−1 > Fi,t−2 then the functionary will increase its contribution. Likewise, Ci,t−1 < Ci,t−2 and
Fi,t−1 < Fi,t−2 incentivize the public servant to increase Ci. The opposite will occur if any of these
inequalities does not hold. More formally
of collusion between the central authority and its functionaries. In these situations, for example, the state attorney’s
office prepares weak cases, expected to be lost in the courts. This strategy is a proven escape valve to the societal
pressures arising from corruption scandals. In the short run, it signals a government that is committed to eradicate
corruption; however, in the long run (once the media has lost interest in the case), it reinforces impunity.
11PID (proportional–integral–derivative) controllers are realistic behavioral models that aim to capture the learning
process of an agent when facing an uncertain environment. Usually, they require three parameters. However, our
application does not rely on free parameters.
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∆Fi,t = Fi,t−1 − Fi,t−2
∆Ci,t = Ci,t−1 −Ci,t−2,
(6)
from which we define
di,t = sgn(∆Fi,t · ∆Ci,t). (7)
Going back to equation 5, we have factor Ci,t−1+Ci,t−22 , which represents the size of the step to
be taken when updating the contribution. For consistency, the min and max functions bound the
public servants’ contributions.
The official’s behavioral component does not require any exogenous parameter, other than the
initial conditions. Therefore, it is extremely convenient for empirical applications. Due to the
spillovers, this learning mechanism generates co-evolutionary dynamics. Hence, we proceed to
model the government, which has to adapt its allocations throughout this co-evolution.
3.3. Central authority
The central authority has a vector of targets T˙ = (T1, . . . ,TN) that it wants to achieve for
its development indicators. These targets are constant through time. Therefore, the government’s
problem is deciding how best to allocate its limited resources to different policies in order to reduce
the gap between the current indicators and the targets. Formally, the government’s problem is
min
 N∑
i=1
(
Ii,t − Ti)2 (8)
Equation 1 indicates that Ii,t is a function of the resource allocation; thus, P1,t, . . . , PN,t are the
control variables of the central authority. We call a specific configuration of these variables an
allocation profile. In addition, the amount of resources that the government can invest is restricted
by
13
N∑
i
Pi,t = B ∀ t. (9)
Note that a small-enough B guarantees Ii,t ∈ [0, 1] and convergence in equation 1. An impor-
tant characteristic of B is that it reflects the amount of non-committed resources of the central
authority. That is, a country might have assigned a large fraction of its public expenditure to
previously-established purposes such as highway maintenance, agricultural subventions, payment
of public debt, etc. Clearly, these expenses are not devoted to transformative policies, so they
cannot be accounted for the reordering of policy priorities that the government aims to achieve.
In addition, Delavallade [2006] points out that the majority of diverted public funds come from
resources allocated to transformative policies rather than already-committed ones. Thus, empir-
ically speaking, B must be chosen such that it reflects how much budget countries can spare in
transforming their economies through public policy.
At each simulation step, the central authority determines an allocation profile and evaluates
the gap between the targets and the observed indicators. Due to the budget constraint, whenever
the government increases the allocation to one policy issue, it takes away resources from another.
Since the government cannot observe the true contribution of its public servants, determining the
allocation profile happens through an adaptive heuristic. The amount of resources allocated to
policy issue i is determined by
pi,t =
qi,t∑N
j q j,t
, (10)
where qi,t is the propensity of assigning resources to policy i, defined as
qi,t = (Ti − Ii,t)(Ki + 1)(1 − θi,t fR,t), (11)
where Ki is the number of outgoing connections of node i, also known as its out-degree.
Equation 11 summarizes the intuition of how the government adapts its policy priorities.12
12Note that equations 10 and 11 use a formulation similar to those in reinforcement learning models [Dhami, 2016];
however, in this adaptive heuristic, the learning process is informed by corruption dynamics only.
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First, the government tries to close the gap Ti − Ii,t between the target and the indicator in order
to minimize equation 8. Second, Ki is a proxy for how critical a policy issue is. That is, policy
issues with a large Ki are central to the development process because they produce spillovers in
several other issues; hence, investments in such policies are more effective to reach the indicators’
targets. Third, the government tries to reach T˙ while, at the same time, attempting to discourage
corruption by decreasing its allocation to those policies where the official has been caught diverting
funds.13 These budgetary changes do not necessarily imply a direct punishment on the public
servant. Nonetheless, a budget readjustment is a signal from the government to the bureaucrat
asking for discipline and a boost in his or her future contributions. Budget changes are subject to
the government capacity to enforce its decisions through the rule of law (that is why fR,t multiplies
θi,t). An alternative interpretation is that a poor rule of law means that central authorities are not
truly interested in sending signals when they find indications of corruption.
Finally, the amount of resources allocated to policy i is
Pi,t = pi,tB. (12)
In summary, the model generates endogenous indicators from a political economy game in
which policy issues are interdependent. The misalignment between the incentives of the central
authority and those of the public servants elicits free-riding and illicit personal gains. To reach
its goals, the government penalizes corruption and assigns resources to policy issues with more
potential for improving overall economic performance.14 The model requires three sources of
exogenous information: the targets Ti, the network of interdependencies between indicators A and
the budget constraint B. All of this information can be obtained from data.
In the next subsection, we describe the computational implementation of this model and pro-
13Empirical evidence suggests that corruption distorts how public spending is allocated. In particular, Delavallade
[2006] shows, with a multinomial model estimated for 64 countries, that corruption reduces expenditure on central
pillars of economic development. The argument is that corrupt government officials divert budgetary resources toward
sectors where it is easier to get ‘juicier’ bribes and to hide any wrongdoing.
14Our methodology considers the problem of corruption from the perspective of the government’s budget allocation.
We assume that corruption and budgetary decisions are outcomes of a political economy game where public officials
have incentives to divert allocated funds. This is consistent with the idea that decentralized forms of corruption
are more damaging to the economy [Bardhan, 1997], and with theoretical studies of corruption as a game between
non-elected officials and a central government that is accountable to the electorate [Accinelli et al., 2016].
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vide a more structured description of the agents’ timing. For illustrative purposes, we simulate the
dynamics of the three main endogenous variables and interpret their evolution through time.
3.4. Computational implementation
The computational implementation of our political economy game consists of instantiating
the central authority and each public servant, and letting them determine their allocations and
contributions, respectively, through time. Algorithm 1 summarizes the agent-based model.
Algorithm 1: Computational implementation
Input: A, T˙ , B, γ
1 foreach step t do
2 foreach public servant i do
3 update contribution Ci,t;
4 update benefits Fi,t;
5 foreach node i do
6 update indicator Ii,t;
7 foreach node i do
8 central authority updates Pi,t;
9 if |I˙i,t − I˙i,t−1| <  ∀i then
10 halt;
In order to provide an illustration of the model dynamics, we present three outcomes of a
typical simulation run on an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random network with 50 nodes and 100 edges. We
assume targets Ti ∼ U(0, 1) and initial resources Pi,0 = 1/N for every i. The initial conditions are
Ii,0 ∼ U(0,Ti) and Ci,0 ∼ U(0, Pi,0) for every i.
Figure 1 illustrates, precisely, the evolution of the three main endogenous variables of our
ABM. The left panel shows the converging dynamics of the development indicators. Here, we can
see that some indicators show a slower convergence speed to their targets. This heterogeneity may
be the result of differences between targets and initial conditions, but also from the effects caused
by the network topology. The middle panel shows the dynamics of the officials’ contributions. It
illustrates the process through which each functionary learns the level of corruption where poten-
tial penalties from the central authority are bearable. The right panel presents the dynamics of
16
the allocations to each policy issue. The ‘thickness’ of the different lines is caused by the punc-
tuated budget adjustments after corruption has been detected. The crossing of allocations through
different steps reflects the process of government adaptation.
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Figure 1: Illustrative model run. This depiction highlights the qualitative nature of the evolution and ordering of
different variables across policy issues.
4. Data and network estimation
In order to perform an empirical application, it is necessary to build a comprehensive database
of development indicators across countries. In this section, we introduce a data set of indicators
classified into 13 development pillars, the necessary normalizations and transformations, and the
method chosen to estimate the network of spillovers between policy issues. Like in any innovative
empirical analysis, the quality of the available data and the estimation methods have to improve as
knowledge evolves. In particular, revisions of this application are expected since the field of net-
work estimation is rapidly growing. For the time being, we have to make specific methodological
choices, as it is the case in the procedure for estimating the direction and weights in the network’s
links.
4.1. Data
Our data consists of 79 policy indicators, at the country level, stemming from three different
sources. First, we use the data from the Global Competitiveness Report –produced by the World
Economic Forum– which includes a large number of indicators related to economic competitive-
ness. The second and third sources are provided by the World Bank: the World Development
Indicators –for measures on the general socioeconomic development of countries– and the World
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Governance Indicators, focusing on topics such as rule of law and government effectiveness among
others. The data set consists of annual observations for 117 countries, covering the 2006–2016 pe-
riod. For 101 countries, we have 11 observations; for 12 countries, we have 10 observations; and
four countries have 9 observations (see all countries included in the database in Table A.1 from
Appendix A).
For a given policy issue i, we normalize the respective indicator across countries c = 1, . . . , 117
and years y = 2006, . . . , 2016 to an interval between zero (worst possible outcome) and one (best
outcome). Formally, this normalization uses the formula
I∼ci,y =
Iˆci,y − Iˆi,min
Iˆi,max − Iˆi,min
, (13)
where Iˆi,min and Iˆi,max are the smallest and largest empirical values of indicator i across countries
and years, and Iˆ denotes the empirical non-normalized value of the observation. For a small num-
ber of highly skewed indicators we use the 4th and the 96th percentiles rather than the minimum or
maximum, respectively.15 To ensure that, for all indicators, higher values are associated with better
outcomes, we apply the inversion 1 − I∼ci,y whenever the original index has a negative correlation
with the GDP per capita. Finally, missing observations (6.3%) were imputed using the multiple
imputation by chained equations method (see Table A.2 from Appendix A for descriptive statistics
on the normalized indicators).
Although we perform our analysis at the level of each country, it is useful to summarize our
results by clustering nations by similarity in the structure of their development indicators. In
the same spirit, we group indicators into 13 widely accepted development pillars representing
broad policy issues that are central for the development of nations. In order to identify clusters of
countries, we apply Ward’s method, using the L2 (Euclidean) norm as the distance metric across
the 79 indicators. The principle behind this method is to group similar countries together by
minimizing the variation of the development indicators within the group, while maximizing the
15If the mean of the computed index using equation 13 is below 0.2 (above 0.8), we use the 96th (4th) percentile
instead of the max (min) function, and then bound the upper (lower) limit to one (zero).
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differences between groups. We choose this approach over the commonly used income groups
defined by the World Bank because it allows us to compare countries in all 79 dimensions rather
than just in one.
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Figure 2: Average levels of indicators by development pillar and cluster. Each colored group represents a development
pillar. Within each pillar, the left-most bar corresponds to cluster 1, while the right-most to cluster 4.
Figure 2 displays the average level of development in each cluster across the 13 pillars. In
general, cluster 1 (the left-most bar within each pillar) contains the most developed countries,
while cluster 4 has the least developed ones. Differences between clusters 1 and 2 are sharper in
the education and R&D innovation pillars, while between clusters 3 and 4 differences are more
evident in the health pillar, but, overall, their discrepancies are less pronounced. In general, the
higher the level of a cluster’s indicators, the higher the development of the constituent countries.
This becomes apparent when looking at the 13 pillars or at the 79 indicators.16 Accordingly, a
successful development strategy should identify the allocation profile that can reach the desired
targets in all these indicators.
16Figure 2 and Figure B.13 in Appendix B show the ‘middle-high development trap’. That is, the gap between
clusters 1 and 2 is the largest. Nevertheless, the health pillar shows its largest gap between clusters 3 and 4. In
addition, indicators such as infrastructure, financial market development, technological readiness, public governance
and business sophistication exhibit significant gaps between clusters 2 and 3.
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4.2. Network estimation
There exist several methods for estimating directed networks, each with different assumptions
and limitations. For example, Bayesian networks elaborated by Pearl [1988], Pearl et al. [2016]
assume acyclical graphs and do not describe causal relationships,17 while Granger-causality net-
works based on Granger [1969] assume underlying linear relationships between variables as indi-
cated in Castagneto-Gissey et al. [2014]. Both of these methods require a high observations-to-
variables ratio, which is a common limitation in development-indicator data. For all these reasons,
we adopt an empirical strategy that has been developed in the estimation of neural networks from
functional magnetic resonance imaging data [Smith et al., 2011, Hoyer et al., 2008]. Our estima-
tion strategy is composed of two steps: 1) identifying which pairs of indicators have a significant
relationship (and their weights), and 2) inferring the causal direction of these relationships. We
apply this strategy to each country.
In order to estimate which pairs of indicators have significant relationships, we apply the
method of triangulated maximally filtered graph (TMFG) [Massara et al., 2017]. This approach
is based on the correlation matrix of development indicators. By measuring pairwise correla-
tions –conditional on other indicators (partial correlations)– a TMFG reveals a meaningful un-
derlying network structure. This network contains information about the complex structure of
inter-relationships between policy issues that is not present in the correlation matrix. The TMFG
approach is a refinement of the planar maximal filtered graphs method [Tumminello et al., 2005],
which was first developed to identify influential stocks in the US stock market [Kenett et al., 2010].
Once we have obtained the underlying network structure of development indicators, we determine
the edges’ directions. For this, we follow the method of likelihood ratios developed by Hyva¨rinen
and Smith [2013].
The resulting graph is a directed weighted network of development indicators. As we men-
tioned earlier, network estimation is a very active topic, constantly producing different methods
across diverse fields. We have chosen these methods due to their suitability for data sets with few
observations and several dimensions, their emphasis on capturing complex structures, and their
17Although graphs are used to infer causal relationships by removing and adding edges, the network in itself is not
informative about the structure of causalities.
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low computational cost. As the field progresses, we expect more and better alternatives, so our
current estimations can be revisited and improved.
A first approximation to describe topological differences is to show adjacency matrices of
aggregated data. For this purpose, we sum the entries of the adjacency matrices across countries
in the same cluster. Figure 3 shows these aggregate networks. Recall that the direction of the
spillovers go from rows to columns. The first feature that stands out is that many entries lie near
the diagonal. Since we sorted the rows and columns by development pillar, this implies that for
some pillars their development indicators tend to have stronger relationships with each other than
with indicators from different pillars. However, there is also a substantial amount of non-zero
entries outside the diagonal, suggesting that there are policy issues with a significant influence
beyond their own pillar. Note that in cluster 1, public governance and cost of doing business
are highly interconnected; that, in cluster 2, there is a more sparse network than in the other
three clusters; that, in cluster 3, public governance has interdependencies across most pillars; that
indicators of education have no connections outside their pillar in cluster 2 and very few in cluster
3 and 4. These facts highlight structural discrepancies in countries that are at different development
stages.18
5. External validation of the model
In the epistemology of ABMs, external validation is usually referred to as the capability of
explaining a real-world phenomenon in a satisfactory way. An explanation, in turn, is satisfactory
when the phenomenon under study is ‘grown’ by the models’ artificial society (i.e., without as-
sumptions about the aggregate behavior of the system). Consequently, a first criterion for external
validation is whether our artificial population –composed of government and officials– is capable
of emerging aggregate real-world stylized facts. In this section, we validate the model using em-
pirical estimations corresponding to the sampling period. For clarity of exposition, we provide the
details about the estimation procedure in section 7.1.
18When estimating the networks for each individual country, we also find similarities and differences across their
topologies (see Figure B.14 in Appendix B).
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Figure 3: Networks aggregated by cluster. Each panel depicts the aggregated adjacency matrix of each cluster. The
nodes (policy issues) have been arranged and colored according to the 13 development pillars. The grayscale dots
denote the presence and weight of edges.
5.1. Cross-national corruption levels
Our first validation exercise consists in evaluating how well the model can reproduce the cross-
national levels of corruption observed in real-world data. The exercise consists of running a sample
of Monte Carlo simulations for each country, feeding it with a budget constraint19 B and the initial
and final values of the indicators in the data set (initial values are the initial conditions and final
values are the targets).
Our empirical measure of corruption comes from an independent development indicator (which
was excluded from the estimation): diversion of public funds; which is exactly the way in which
we define corruption in the model. Our theoretical per-period measure of corruption at the func-
tionary level is the gap Pi − Ci. In order to build an aggregate measure for an entire simulation,
we sum across its ` periods. Consequently, we define corruption at the country level through the
expression
D¯ =
1
NB
N∑
i=1
∑`
t=0
(Pi,t −Ci,t) (14)
19The budget constrain is obtained from an indicator of the government expenditure as a fraction of GDP. By using
this indicator (as opposed to the absolute expenditure), we take into account the fact that a part of the expenditure is
already committed to maintaining the current levels of the indicators.
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where N is the number of development indicators and B controls for the exogenous cross-national
variation originated from the budget constraint.
In summary, we estimate allocation profiles of each country and aggregate the results across
indicators to produce comparisons between countries. In order to provide the best possible infer-
ence, we calibrate the parameter γ across countries (see Appendix C for details).20. The left panel
in Figure 4 shows the point estimates of corruption for each country and their empirical counter-
parts. Clearly, the model is able to explain most of the cross-national variation in the observed
level of corruption (R2 = .94). The right panel shows the empirical and estimated marginal contri-
butions of each country to overall corruption through a cumulative plot. In both cases, Spearman
rank-order correlation tests yield coefficients larger than 0.96, providing a first piece of external
validation.
countries (sorted from least to most corrupt)
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
le
ve
l o
f c
or
ru
pt
io
n
R2= . 94
data
model
countries (sorted from least to most corrupt)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
cu
m
ul
at
iv
e 
le
ve
l o
f c
or
ru
pt
io
n data
model
Figure 4: External validation I. Levels of corruption by country. Sampled period: 2006–2016. Model estimation was
done by applying a clustering algorithm that classifies countries into different levels of γ. This procedure seeks to
minimize the MSE while controlling for overfitting (see Appendix C for details). Each point estimate is the average of
1,000 Monte Carlo simulations. The empirical levels of corruption are measured with the 11-year averages for each
country. The R2 is obtained through the classic formula 1 −
∑
(yi−yˆi)2∑
(yi−y¯)2 .
5.2. The corruption-performance relationship
Extensive evidence shows that the degree of corruption observed across countries is negatively
related to their level of economic development (or its performance) [Svensson, 2005]. Although
causality seems to run in both directions, it is commonly argued that economic factors create a
demand for better institutions of governance and, thus, for less corruption. Besides this negative
20The qualitative features of our validation also hold for γ = 1
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relationship, cross-national data shows four additional stylized facts: (i) a substantial variation of
corruption across countries at the same development stage; (ii) such variation is relatively lower
among developed countries; (iii) a large number of countries with high levels of corruption; and
(iv) no developing country with a level of corruption similar or lower to that exhibited by the
average advance nation.21
In order to empirically measure a country’s performance, we calculate the mean of its different
development indicators (first across the 11 years of the sample and then across the 79 indicators).
For its theoretical counterpart, we average the endogenous indicators from the model, first across
the simulation steps and then across indicators as in the expression
I¯ =
1
N
∑
i
1
`i
`i∑
t
Ii,t. (15)
Note that I¯ may be different from the empirical average indicator of a country. This is so
because certain indicators converge faster than others, reweighting their inter-temporal averages.
Therefore, reorderings in terms of performance are possible, especially since the model is cal-
ibrated to minimize the mean squared error (MSE) only with respect to corruption, not perfor-
mance. The left panel in Figure 5 shows the empirical relationship between corruption and perfor-
mance (the average of all the indicators). The right panel shows the outcome of the model.
The similarity between both panels in Figure 5 is remarkable; hence, we can say that the
model is informative.22 More specifically, the model is capable of emerging the five stylized facts
previously mentioned. First, it generates a negative correlation between overall performance and
corruption (with a Spearman correlation of -0.85, while the empirical one is estimated at -0.84).
Second, countries with similar performance exhibit variation in their levels of corruption. Third,
there is heterogeneity in the clusters’ corruption variance; for example, cluster 2 (mid-high level
of development) has a larger variation than the most developed nations (cluster 1). Fourth, a
21To be more precise, we observe practically no overlap between the levels of corruption from laggard countries
(clusters 3-4) and from the most developed ones (cluster 1), and a minimal one between clusters 2 and 1.
22It must be noted that, although the model is fed with the initial and final values of the empirical indicators, this
result is not tautological. This is so because, on one hand, the indicators’ values in any period 0 < t < n are simulated.
On the other hand, the model’s indicator of corruption is generated through the endogenous variables Ci,t and Pi,t,
which are not available in the empirical data set.
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Figure 5: External validation II. Emergence of the corruption-performance relationship. Each dot in the left panel
corresponds to an 11-years average for a country. The Y-axis corresponds to the average for diversion of public funds,
directly obtained from an indicator in the data set (under the development pillar of public governance). The X-axis is
the arithmetic mean of the rest of the observed indicators. The coordinates of the dots in the right panel are computed
using equations 14 and 15. These values were obtained by running 1,000 Monte Carlo simulations for each country.
In both panels, each dot has been labeled with its country initials and colored according to its cluster.
large amount of countries are clumped in the upper-left quadrant of the plot, which is the area
corresponding to low performance and high corruption (all countries in clusters 4 and 3 and some
of cluster 2). Fifth, there is practically no overlap between the levels of corruption from countries
in cluster 1 and from those in clusters 3 and 4. The ability to emerge all the stylized facts of the
corruption-performance relationship validates the relevance of the model’s social mechanisms as
a whole. To be more precise, these mechanisms are, mainly, the learning process of the public
servants, the principal–agent problem related to monitoring and punishment of corruption and the
spillover effects through the network of policy issues.
6. Internal validation of social mechanisms
The internal validation (or sensitivity analysis) of an ABM has the purpose of detecting whether
the model’s social mechanisms are relevant for generating its outputs. Such mechanisms are cho-
sen to specify the causal channels that can, arguably, explain the statistical regularities produced
by the model. Some mechanisms establish the connection between the agents’ decisions and the
environment. Other mechanisms specify the interactions between agents and generate societal
outcomes.
In this section, we concentrate on the internal validation of the model’s three main components:
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(a) the government’s adaptive behavior, (b) the bureaucrats’ learning processes and (c) the spillover
network. We validate them by showing their impact on (i) the corruption point estimates, (ii) the
corruption-performance relationship, (iii) the public servants’ incentives to contribute, and the (iv)
configuration of the top 10 priorities in allocation profiles.
Internal validation is achieved via sensitivity analysis, which consists in studying the model’s
outcomes under different specifications. In each specification, we ‘turn off’ one of the compo-
nents. To turn off government behaviour, we replace the adaptive heuristic by a random choice
Pi ∼ U(0, 1) (normalizing to make sure they add up to B). For the public servants, we replace
the heuristic for learning Ci with a uniformly-distributed random choice in [0, Pi]. Finally, to de-
activate the spillover effects, we replace A with a weighted identity matrix in equation 1, while
leaving everything else intact. Let us refer to the original specification as the full model. When a
simulation outcome differs from the one of the full model, we say that the component or mecha-
nism is relevant to explain it. Something distinctive about internal ABM validation is the ability
to perform tests at the both micro- and macro-levels. This is so because, here, every behavior
and interaction is explicit, and their outcomes do not rely on assumptions about coordination or
aggregation. Hence, the evidence that we present in this section goes beyond the usual standards
of alternative empirical approaches.23
6.1. Sensitivity of cross-national corruption levels
Figure 6 shows the estimated levels of corruption without each of the main model components.
The left panel shows the point estimates. Confidence intervals have been computed for each point
estimate of the full model (too narrow to show them visually), suggesting that, in most cases,
deactivating the respective mechanism produces a significant deviation from the estimate. The
right panel shows the same data in its cumulative form. Clearly, each of the three components has
an important effect in the countries’ marginal contributions to overall corruption.
23The results from the sensitivity analysis also hold for the parameter-free version of the model (γ = 1), reinforcing
the validity of the chosen social mechanisms.
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Figure 6: Internal validation I. Sensitivity of cross-national corruption levels. Left panel: point estimates. Right panel:
cumulative level of corruption.
6.2. Sensitivity of the corruption-performance relationship
Figure 7 shows a significant distortion of the corruption-performance relationship when deacti-
vating the government or the public servants. In both cases, the correlation decreases significantly.
In contrast, there is no apparent change when the spillovers are removed (see Figure D.17 in Ap-
pendix D.1). Given that the network provides a way to deal with the interdependence between
policy issues, this last result is intriguing and deserves further analysis, which we elaborate in
section 7.1.
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Figure 7: Internal validation II. Sensitivity of the corruption-performance relationship. Right panel: random func-
tionaries’ contributions. Left panel: random government’s allocations.
The model seems particularly sensitive to the learning mechanism of the public servants. We
know, from the equations of our behavioral game, that the variables of rule of law and quality
of monitoring efforts, are important for the agents’ learning process. Hence, both components
influence the emergence of the stylized facts in this relationship. Nevertheless, the inclusion of
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these variables is not sufficient to produce the observed corruption-performance pattern. For ex-
ample, we perform simulations holding monitoring and punishment efforts fixed and find that, for
fR,t = fC,t = .5, the relationship is still negative but the model overestimates corruption in low-
corruption countries and underestimates it in high-corruption ones (see Appendix D.1 for details).
6.3. Sensitivity to the spillover network
So far, we have shown that the network affects the estimates on corruption, but not the corruption-
performance relationship. While these tests only consider aggregate stylized facts, there exists a
variety of tests that can be performed at the micro-level. Put differently, we have only explored the
role of the spillovers at a cross-national level, while its most relevant effects occur within coun-
tries. For instance, different nodes are expected to exhibit different outcomes depending on their
connectivity. Perhaps the clearest way to show this is by following our argument on how “positive
network effects can mask the incompetence of the government officials” (see section 1). In terms of
the model’s outputs, we would expect that, ceteris paribus, nodes with more incoming spillovers
would contribute less.
The left panel in Figure 8 shows the relationship between incoming spillovers (γ
∑
jA ji) and
contributions ( 1
`i
∑`i
t Ci,t) at the level of each node i, calculated from Monte Carlo simulations over
the entire data set. Different contributions were averaged across nodes with a similar amount
of incoming spillovers (i.e., they were binned) –also known as incoming strength. In order to
demonstrate the effect of the network, the right panel shows the same output, but for the model
without spillovers. Clearly, removing the network mitigates the negative relationship between
incoming spillovers and contributions. In fact, statistically speaking, the relationship for the model
without a network is negligible (the Spearman correlation yields a p-value of 0.85). Accordingly,
these simulation outcomes are consistent with the theoretical foundations of our model.
6.4. Sensitivity of the government’s top priorities
Perhaps the most important effect of the network is in the estimation of the allocation profile.
That is, when a consultant ignores the spillover effects, he or she may recommend erroneous pol-
icy priorities. To illustrate this, let us consider the top 10 policy issues in the estimated allocation
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Figure 8: Internal validation III. Relationship between incoming spillovers and contributions. Left panel: complete
model. Right panel: model without spillovers. The dots correspond to contributions averaged across nodes that fall
in the same bin of incoming strength. The unit of analysis is country-node and the value of the observation is the
inter-temporal average.
profiles. If the network affects this estimation, removing it should yield a significantly different
set of top-10 policy issues. We evaluate this difference through the Jaccard membership index.
Here, a value of 1 means that the top 10 priorities are the same with or without network (regard-
less of the order), while 0 means that they are entirely different. Figure 9 shows a systematic
discrepancy between the top-10 priorities with and without spillovers. In particular, we obtain an
average Jacccard close to 0.4 across all countries; thus, the highest allocations differ considerably
when we discard the spillover effects from the analysis. These results speak not only of the rel-
evance of the network, but of the importance of considering country-specific contexts. Through
other methodologies, this is not obvious because one has to work with aggregated data and aver-
age effects. Therefore, this exercise demonstrates the strengths of a computational approach in a
problem where country-specificity is important for policy prescriptions.
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Figure 9: Internal validation IV. Similarity of the top-10 priorities (Jaccard index). The top priorities are the policy
issues that received the most resources from the allocation profile.
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7. Applications
In this section we present, firstly, the general results of a retrospective analysis where we infer
the average allocation profiles that countries used during the observation period. Secondly, in a
prospective analysis, we present two types of Monte Carlo simulations to illustrate the applicability
of our framework for guiding policy-making. On one hand, we infer the policy priorities of three
country cases, as if they would imitate more advanced nations. Then, on the other, we infer the
most feasible development mode for each developing country in the sample (i.e. those outside
cluster 1).
7.1. Estimating past policy priorities
In order to infer the allocation profiles used in the past decade, we assume that the targets
for the set of development indicators coincide with the values observed at the end of the sampling
period. Let us look into the estimation of allocation profiles. I∼i,t denotes the empirical development
indicator of policy issue i during the tth period of the data set. For a given country, the exercise
consists of running the model using the estimated network, initial conditions Ii,0 = I∼i,0, targets
Ti = I∼i,n (where n is the last observation in the data), and a budget constraint B. Each simulation
m generates N time series of the form Pmi,0, . . . P
m
i,`m
where `m is the end period of simulation m. We
obtain the average allocation P¯mi =
1
`m
∑`m
t=0 P
m
i,t in simulation m by computing the inter-temporal
average of its time series. Finally, we compute the mean P¯i = 1m
∑M
m=1 P¯
m
i across simulations.
For presentation purposes, we group this information into clusters and development pillars, and
compute averages.24
Figure 10 presents the average allocation profiles at the level of development pillars and clus-
ters. Six important results emerge from this result:
1. Within each cluster, policy priorities are not uniform across development pillars.
2. Each cluster has a different ordering of their policy priorities.
24The initial values of Fi,0, Fi,−1, Ci,0, Ci,0 and Pi,0 are randomly determined in each simulation. However, sensi-
tivity tests show that the estimated allocation profiles do not change significantly with the initial conditions of these
variables.
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3. Policy priorities are not dictated by the average indicators (Figure 2), which means that the
model captures the transformative character of the allocation profiles.
4. On average, countries in clusters 3 and 4 prioritized infrastructure; in cluster 2, cost of doing
business; in cluster 1, education.
5. On average, the lowest priority for countries in cluster 4 and 2 was given to the governance
of firms; in clusters 3 to education and in cluster 1 to infrastructure.25
6. Transformative policies across clusters were very different in the following pillars: labor
market efficiency, health and financial market development. On the contrary, they were
relatively similar in the following pillars: business sophistication, goods markets efficiency
and technological readiness.
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Figure 10: Average allocation profiles by cluster and development pillar. Each color represents a development pillar.
Within each pillar, the left-most bar corresponds to cluster 1 and the right-most to cluster 4. The vertical lines on top
of the bars denote the standard errors, computed from the cross-national variation. Number of simulations: 1,000 per
country.
In brief, it can be argued that, during our sampling period, the empirical evidence shows that
countries followed different paths depending on their development stage. Likewise, the estima-
tions of policy priorities indicate that countries did not set them up in terms of the development
25Recall that we are only measuring transformative changes, not total budget allocations. Hence, while a coun-
try like Germany may have the highest committed expenditure in infrastructure, it does does not need to spend a
substantial amount in transforming it.
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gaps observed between pillars; for example, public governance, R&D innovation, business so-
phistication and education in cluster 2 were not prioritized despite their large gaps with respect
to cluster 1. Altogether, the model is capable of capturing the wide spectrum of policy priorities
for the countries in the data set and, hence, it has the potential to discover new transformative
allocation profiles when different targets are established.
7.2. Following development footprints
In 1962, the Japanese economist Kaname Akamatsu conceived the theory of the ‘flying geese’
to describe a ‘catch-up’ development process, observed in Asian countries during the 20th century
[Akamatsu, 1962]. His theory was inspired by the observation that Asian economies developed
according to an inverted-V pattern, like wild flying geese. In other words, advanced economies
move to more sophisticated industries while developing countries become competitive in those
industries left behind.26
The flying geese phenomenon is pervasive among countries that have developed successfully
since the industrial revolution [Lin, 2013]. According to Lin and Monga [2013], the catch-up
process was possible because these countries targeted mature industries from advanced countries
with similar factor endowments and a relatively close GDP per capita. Hence, a latent compara-
tive advantage becomes manifest when a country undertakes important changes in their physical
and institutional infrastructure. Such changes occur when policies are implemented to deal with
binding constraints and when the governance architecture is modified to handle information and
coordination failures. In other words, the ‘flying geese’ of industrial transformation becomes vi-
able because countries moving up in the development ladder have target nations in mind when
implementing transformative policies. For this reason, policy indicators can be seen as develop-
ment footprints that guide countries when climbing up the ladder. We say that a country adopts a
‘development mode’ when it follows the footprints of another country (e.g., Argentina adopts the
French development mode when the former targets the indicators of the latter).
If, indeed, a country decides to adopt a ‘development mode’, the question is: how should
26Recent evidence of this process and the creation of comparative advantages in Asian countries can be found in
Ozawa [2011].
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the central authority prioritize public policies? Our framework provides a method to address this
question. Consider country x and its vector I˙∼xn of observed development indicators. Suppose x
wants to follow the path of country y. Then, x’s targets become T˙ x = I˙∼yn . The average allocation
profile resulting from applying the model to this data is informative about the policy priorities that
x would pursue if it was to adopt y as its development mode.
According to empirical evidence, emerging economies tend to follow modes that are, some-
how, similar in terms of their productive and social capabilities. In the context of our analysis,
we can think of this notion of proximity as the four clusters. Hence, we assume that members
of cluster 4 try to follow countries from cluster 3, and these ones chase those in cluster 2, and so
forth. Let us illustrate this by looking at three countries: Mexico in cluster 2, Albania in cluster 3
and Nigeria in cluster 4; and assuming that they try to follow the development footprints of two
countries from the cluster above theirs.
Figure 11 shows the average allocation profile of each catch-up process. The panels present
the results for each of the three countries when trying to follow two more-advanced countries
(i.e., development modes). In the left panels, we can see that the pillars of public governance and
R&D are the two top priorities for Mexico, regardless if it tries to follow Switzerland or Japan.
However, depending on the development footprints that Mexico tries to follow, other policy issues
such as infrastructure occupy a very different position in its allocation profile. This reordering of
priorities becomes more obvious in the case of Albania. For example, if Albania attempts to follow
Spain, its second priority should be the development of financial markets. However, this policy
issue becomes Albania’s 6th allocation when it tries to follow China; although, for both targeted
countries goods market efficiency is most important.
These changes in policy priorities are not only dependent on which development footprints
a country tries to track, but also on the country’s initial conditions. For instance, Nigeria’s top
priority is health, regardless if it tries to copy Russia or Algeria. In contrast, the health pillar is
not so important in Mexico’s allocation profiles, and even less in Albania’s where it is positioned
at the bottom half. As we can see, policy priorities depend on the specific country–mode pair and,
thus, on the network topology, budget and governance indicators of the imitator. This highlights
the importance of considering the individual context of nations when providing policy advice on
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Figure 11: Average allocation profiles of three country cases. Number of simulations: 1,000 per pair of countries.
how to achieve development goals.
Finally, we would like to provide a global view of the development footprints of all countries
in our data set (except countries in cluster 1 because they cannot follow anyone else). For this,
we estimate the allocation profile of every country when trying to mimic each nation from the
cluster above. Any given country has different development modes that it can follow. Then, the
natural question is, which one should it choose? The answer is, obviously, context-specific and
depends on defining a criterion that is relevant to the country. For example, a country may want
to adopt a specific development mode because it is ‘easier’ to achieve; because the end product
would yield higher indicators; or because it puts more weight on developing a particular policy
issue. Whichever the criterion is, the recommended priorities will depend on the network topology
and the learning process of the country’s agents.
To illustrate this, we assume that the most feasible development mode is the one that requires
the least changes to the allocation profile already adopted by a country (the one estimated in section
7.1). That is, if country x has several options of countries to imitate, it should choose the one that
requires the most similar allocation profile to the one already estimated for the 2006–2016 period.
Here, we measure similarity between average allocation profiles through the matrix version of the
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Jaccard index. Common sense would tell us that similarity between allocation profiles is heavily
determined by the proximity between the x’s and y’s development indicators. However, as we
will show, similarities with the target’s indicators are not the only driver. The game’s learning
dynamics and the network topology may be more important. In fact, most of the times, the most
feasible target of x is different from the the country with which x has the highest target-indicator
similarity (see Appendix E).
Figure 12 provides an overall picture of countries and their development modes. Here, coun-
tries are arranged by cluster, and a connection between x (from the lower cluster) and y (from the
higher cluster) means that y is the most feasible development mode that x can adopt (at least from
y’s cluster). The weight of the links represents differences in feasibility (thicker is more feasi-
ble). Likewise, we have colored the edges in order to denote the top policy priority of the average
allocation profile.
There are some patterns that stand out in Figure 12. For example, the catch-up processes
from countries in cluster 4 are dominated by the health and the cost of doing business pillars.
In cluster 3, the top priorities are more inclined toward public governance, infrastructure and
the macro environment. Members of cluster 2 exhibit more heterogeneity in their top priorities,
where infrastructure is the most frequent; while public governance, R&D and the macroeconomic
environment are also common.
In terms of development modes, Figure 12 suggests that there are countries with more ‘fol-
lowable’ footprints. For example, from cluster 3, Serbia concentrates more incoming edges from
cluster 4. In cluster 2, Slovenia is the leader. Finally, from cluster 1, the main mode is Israel,
yet United States, Singapore, Hong Kong, United Arab Emirates and Denmark are also attractive
targets. From these results, it is clear that, as countries develop, more options are available as
feasible targets.
The likelihood of copying the transformative capabilities of a more advanced country not only
depends on how large the required changes are, it also has to do with political economy considera-
tions, aside from those contemplated in this study; for example, with how rapidly policy indicators
can be tracked; with the resemblance between the productive structures of a country and its devel-
opment mode; and with the ‘best practices’ that a society might be allowed to pursue in the future.
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Nonetheless, the previous statistical exercise is very helpful to show that some development modes
are more reachable than others and, thus, governments should be aware of this fact when setting
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targets for their indicators. In other words, although many countries want to follow the German
mode, this European country might not be an easy catch.
8. Conclusions
In this paper, we have investigated the challenging problem of how governments set policy
priorities for achieving transformative development goals. We elaborated a theoretical framework
that, in contrast with existing approaches, allows us to account for the complex network of inter-
dependencies between policy issues, which can be highly specific to the context of each nation.
Through a political economy game on a network, we model how governments adapt policy prior-
ities in order to discourage decentralized forms of corruption while attaining specific targets. Our
computational analysis of the model shows that it can produce well-known stylized facts about
corruption and socioeconomic performance, as well as replicating corruption levels across coun-
tries.
Besides providing evidence of external validation, we subject the model to multiple internal
validation tests, demonstrating the relevance of specific social mechanisms. In particular, these
sensitivity tests show the importance of the government’s allocation heuristic, the relevance of
co-evolutionary learning among agents and the spillover effects created by the network of policy
issues. That is, we show that the causal channels assumed in the model are informative, since
they explain the model’s outputs between (e.g., corruption levels) and within (e.g., allocation and
contribution profiles) countries. Hence, we argue that the theoretical support of our methodol-
ogy is well grounded and, thus, our policy prescriptions are empirically sound and provide an
interpretation that is consistent with the models’ logic.
Using data on 79 development indicators for 117 countries, we provide a first application
of this framework. Our computational procedure is rather simple since only one parameter is
estimated. The empirical analysis reveals that, in the sampling period of 2006–2016, countries
pursued a wide variety of development modes reflected in their policy priorities. This retrospective
analysis indicates that the observed priorities are not closely related to the empirical gaps between
development indicators, as a simple rule for the allocation of budgetary resources would suggest.
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Moreover, the simulation results of the ABM indicate that context matters when designing policy
guidelines to produce a structural change in any economy.
In the prospective application, we argue that there are different development modes that any
country can follow in order to generate transformative capabilities. Because each of these modes
has priority rankings, the relevant aspect of pursuing a particular strategy has to do with the consis-
tency of its policies; that is, with following closely the suggested prioritization scheme. We find,
for example, that Albania can follow a Spanish mode that emphasizes goods markets efficiency,
financial market development, public governance and infrastructure; or undertake a Chinese mode
whose main four concerns are goods market efficiency, R&D innovation, labor market efficiency
and the macroeconomic environment; among other possible development modes.
An empirical extension of this paper is to design and analyze other criteria for establishing
which countries can be attractive targets. One possibility is to specify a sample of more advanced
countries with an appealing GDP per capita or with a good-enough level of the human devel-
opment index. Then, this set can be further constrained in terms of similarity in its productive
structure, international trade composition, culture, geographical proximity, political regime or any
combination of the above. Likewise, for a further analysis of the robustness of our framework,
it can be implemented with different data, such as development indicators at a sub-national level,
and then tested for its capabilities of replication. It would be also enlightening to explore different
methods of network calibration and alternative lag structures of the variables involved. These ex-
ercises could be beneficial for improving the model’s goodness of fit and for increasing the number
of replicated outcomes.
Although, we did not compute marginal effects for each public issue in this paper; this type
of empirical results could also be obtained from our methodology. Thus, another interesting ex-
tension would be to remove investments in certain policy issues by means of sensitivity analyses.
That is, in the government’s behavioral model, we can preclude allocations to a specific issue,
while the associated indicator can still grow due to spillover effects. Through this procedure, one
could measure relative impacts on a counter-factual basis and using different dependent variables
such as convergence time and corruption levels.
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Appendix A. Descriptive statistics
Table A.1 provides a list of all clusters and a list of all countries in each cluster. Table A.2
presents summary statistics for each indicator in the study.
Table A.1: List of countries by cluster
Cluster Number of countries Countries
1) High 24 ARE AUS AUT BEL CAN CHE DEU DNK FIN FRA
GBR HKG IRL ISR JPN KOR MYS NLD NOR NZL
QAT SGP SWE USA
2) Mid-high 45 BHR BRA BWA CHL CHN COL CRI CZE EGY ESP
EST GRC GTM HND HRV HUN IDN IND ITA JAM
JOR KWT LKA LTU LVA MAR MEX MUS NAM
OMN PAN PER PHL POL PRT SAU SLV SVK SVN
THA TTO TUN TUR URY ZAF
3) Mid-low 24 ALB ARG ARM AZE BGD BGR BIH BOL DOM DZA
ECU GEO KAZ KGZ MKD MNG NIC NPL PRY RUS
SRB TJK UKR VEN
4) Low 24 BDI BEN BFA CIV CMR ETH GHA GMB KEN KHM
MDG MLI MOZ MRT MWI NGA PAK SEN TCD TZA
UGA VNM ZMB ZWE
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Table A.2: Descriptive statistics
Pillars and indicators N2 Switch Mean SD
Governance of firms
P01 1 Ethical behavior of firms No No 0.42 0.22
P01 2 Strength of auditing and reporting standards No No 0.55 0.19
P01 3 Efficacy of corporate boards No No 0.58 0.14
P01 4 Protection of minority shareholders’ interests No No 0.51 0.19
Infrastructure
P02 1 Quality of overall infrastructure No No 0.50 0.24
P02 2 Quality of roads No No 0.49 0.24
P02 4 Quality of port infrastructure No No 0.52 0.21
P02 5 Quality of air transport infrastructure No No 0.61 0.19
P02 6 Available airline seat km/(week*population), millions Yes No 0.14 0.21
P02 7 Quality of electricity supply No No 0.60 0.27
P02 8 Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people) No No 0.31 0.13
P02 9 Improved sanitation facilities, urban (% of urban population with
access) ¡norm2
No No 0.77 0.28
Macroeconomic environment
P03 1 Inflation, annual % change No Yes 0.42 0.17
P03 2 General government debt, % GDP Yes No 0.39 0.23
P03 3 Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current USD) Yes No 0.47 0.19
P03 4 Imports as a percentage of GDP Yes Yes 0.39 0.23
P03 5 Exports as a percentage of GDP Yes No 0.41 0.23
Health
P04 3 Tuberculosis cases/100,000 pop. Yes Yes 0.79 0.27
P04 6 Business impact of HIV/AIDS No No 0.66 0.21
P04 7 Infant mortality, deaths/1,000 live births No Yes 0.71 0.31
P04 8 Adolescent fertility rate (births per 1,000 women ages 15-19) No Yes 0.77 0.20
P04 9 Health expenditure, public (% of GDP) No No 0.45 0.26
P04 10 Immunization, DPT (% of children ages 12-23 months) Yes No 0.81 0.23
P04 11 Life expectancy at birth, total (years) No No 0.69 0.23
P04 12 Survival to age 65, female (% of cohort) No No 0.77 0.22
P04 13 Survival to age 65, male (% of cohort) No No 0.70 0.22
Education
P05 1 Quality of primary education No No 0.43 0.20
P05 2 Quality of math and science education No No 0.50 0.19
P05 3 Extent of staff training No No 0.54 0.18
Goods market efficiency
P06 1 Intensity of local competition No No 0.63 0.17
P06 2 Extent of market dominance No No 0.44 0.20
P06 3 Effectiveness of anti-monopoly policy No No 0.48 0.20
P06 5 Agricultural policy costs No No 0.50 0.13
P06 7 Degree of customer orientation No No 0.59 0.16
P06 8 Buyer sophistication No No 0.42 0.19
Labor market efficiency
P07 1 Cooperation in labor-employer relations No No 0.51 0.17
P07 2 Redundancy costs, weeks of salary* Yes Yes 0.65 0.29
P07 4 Pay and productivity No No 0.48 0.17
P07 5 Reliance on professional management No No 0.55 0.20
P07 8 Labor force participation rate for ages 15-24, total (%) (modeled
ILO estimate)
No No 0.48 0.21
Financial market development
P08 3 Financing through local equity market No No 0.51 0.20
P08 4 Ease of access to loans No No 0.40 0.19
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Table A.2: continued
Pillars and indicators N2 Switch Mean SD
P08 5 Venture capital availability No No 0.35 0.19
P08 6 Soundness of banks No No 0.69 0.16
P08 7 Regulation of securities exchanges No No 0.58 0.18
Technological readiness
P09 1 Availability of latest technologies No No 0.60 0.20
P09 2 Firm-level technology absorption No No 0.54 0.19
P09 3 FDI and technology transfer No No 0.57 0.16
Business sophistication
P10 1 Local supplier quantity No No 0.56 0.15
P10 2 Local supplier quality No No 0.53 0.18
P10 3 State of cluster development No No 0.49 0.21
P10 4 Nature of competitive advantage No No 0.38 0.23
P10 5 Value chain breadth No No 0.44 0.20
P10 6 Control of international distribution No No 0.52 0.18
P10 7 Production process sophistication No No 0.47 0.21
P10 8 Extent of marketing No No 0.52 0.20
P10 9 Willingness to delegate authority No No 0.43 0.18
R+D Innovation
P11 1 Capacity for innovation No No 0.42 0.21
P11 2 Quality of scientific research institutions No No 0.49 0.20
P11 3 Company spending on R+D No No 0.38 0.20
P11 4 University-industry collaboration in R+D No No 0.47 0.21
P11 5 Government procurement of advanced tech. products No No 0.43 0.14
P11 6 Availability of scientists and engineers No No 0.49 0.19
P11 7 Intellectual property protection No No 0.45 0.23
Public Governance
P12 1 Control of Corruption No No 0.45 0.23
P12 2 Government Effectiveness No No 0.55 0.19
P12 3 Regulatory Quality No No 0.60 0.18
P12 4 Rule of Law No No 0.58 0.20
P12 5 Voice and Accountability No No 0.58 0.22
P12 6 Property rights No No 0.57 0.21
P12 7 Diversion of public funds No No 0.45 0.23
P12 8 Public trust in politicians No No 0.33 0.23
P12 9 Judicial independence No No 0.50 0.24
Cost of doing business
P13 1 Cost of business start-up procedures (% of GNI per capita) Yes Yes 0.86 0.22
P13 2 Time required to enforce a contract (days) No Yes 0.70 0.17
P13 3 Time required to register property (days) Yes Yes 0.82 0.18
P13 4 Time required to start a business (days) Yes Yes 0.77 0.21
P13 5 Time to resolve insolvency (years) No Yes 0.75 0.14
P13 6 Business costs of terrorism No No 0.71 0.18
P13 7 Business costs of crime and violence No No 0.56 0.22
Notes: The column N2 indicates whether we applied the skewness correction and column Switch informs about
indicators that have been inverted. All statistics are based on the full sample.
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Appendix B. Development indicators and network calibration
Appendix B.1. Development indicators across clusters
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Figure B.13: Each color shade corresponds to a development pillar. The wider the shaded area, the more development indicators in the correspond-
ing pillar. For countries without observations for 2016, we take the most recent one. The clusters correspond to those in Table A.1.
Appendix B.2. Network estimation for individual countries
With the methodology for estimating directed networks, it is possible to estimate the interde-
pendencies among policy issues for any country in the data. Once this is done, we can analyze
how similar are the topologies of all pair of countries. For this, we employ the weighted Jaccard
index
S (A,B) =
∑
i
∑
j min(Ai j,Bi j)∑
i
∑
j max(Ai j,Bi j)
, (B.1)
which measures the degree of similarity between the two directed weighted networks encoded in
adjacency matrices A and B. The range of S goes from zero (if the networks are entirely different)
to one (if A = B). This version of the Jaccard index must not be confused with the membership
index used in section 6.4, which compares similarity between two sets.
Figure B.14 shows a matrix of Jaccard indices between every pair of countries. We have
sorted the rows and columns according to the average indicators, as computed in equation 15,
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Figure B.14: Network similarity between countries. Yellow means higher Jaccard indices, while blue means lower ones.
which is indicative of how developed a country is. Then, entries concentrated around the diagonal
would reveal that countries in similar stages of development have some degree of similarity in
their networks of indicators. From the figure, it is clear that this is the case for countries with high
average indicators. In addition, it is possible to identify two more clusters around the diagonal:
one for middle-high income countries, and another for the least developed countries. Despite these
patterns, several countries share relatively similar topologies with nations that are in a different
development stage.
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Appendix C. Model calibration
In principle, the model can be used to estimate the allocation profile of a specific country
without calibrating free parameters. However, in order to perform a cross country analysis with
aggregated outputs, it is convenient to calibrate the model. In this case, we can obtain corrup-
tion estimates similar to the ones observed in real-world data. This is, precisely, the purpose of
introducing parameter γ in equation 3.27
The calibration of γ across countries can be thought as estimating parameter heterogeneity in
a regression model. However, the estimation method differs significantly due to the computational
nature of the model. More specifically, estimating γ corresponds to solving the classification
problem of clustering. In other words, calibrating γ translates into finding a set of distinct values
under which all countries can be classified. This set should be such that we minimize the error
between the observed and the estimated levels of corruption while penalizing potential overfitting.
On one hand, the model without calibration implies a homogeneous γ, which means that there is
only one cluster. On the other, a unique γ for each country implies a cluster for each nation, which
is an obvious overfit. Note that even an overfit does not guarantee a perfect fit. This is so because,
for a specific country, γ lives in (0, θ). If γ = 0, then the indicators do not grow and the model
never converges. The other extreme happens when γ is too large. In this case, the growth of the
indicator in a single step may be too large to reach convergence. Therefore, γ itself may not be
enough to provide the necessary variation for a perfect fit.
Since the units of the empirical indicator of diversion of public funds are different from the ones
of the theoretical variable of corruption, as reflected by equation 14, we aim to fit the model ex-
ploiting the empirical structure of relative differences in corruption between countries. To achieve
this, our calibration strategy consists of two methods. The first one finds the optimal reference
point to compute relative levels of corruption. The second determines the distinct values that γ
should take in order to minimize the mean squared error (MSE) and control for overfitting.
27For a single country, the order of policy priorities does not change significantly across different levels of γ,
although their differences do, which might affect aggregation. The Spearman correlation coefficient comparing the
rank-order correlation between profiles corresponding to different γs within the same country yields more than 0.9 in
all countries. For this reason, it is safe to assume γ = 1 when making country-level inference about the order of policy
priorities.
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Appendix C.1. The ‘ratios’ method
This step begins with a proposed set Γ = {γ1 . . . γn} of distinct values. The idea is to find
the best way to classify countries across Γ such that the MSE between the empirical indicator of
diversion of public funds and D¯ in equation equation 14 is minimum. In order to achieve this, we
perform the following algorithm.
1. Start with a reference country r.
2. Pick a γ ∈ Γ and compute D¯ for the reference country.
3. Select an evaluation country e and compute the rate Ie/Ir, where I is the empirical indicator
of diversion of public funds.
4. Choose a γ ∈ Γ for the evaluation country such that |Ie/Ir − D¯e/D¯r| is minimal.
5. Repeat steps 3 and 4 until all countries have been evaluated.
6. Compute the mean squared error 1S
∑S
i=1(Ie/Ir− Dˆe/Dˆr)2, where S is the number of countries
in the sample.
7. Repeat steps 2 to 6 for every γ ∈ Γ and choose the reference γ that minimizes the MSE.
8. Repeat steps 1 to 6 to obtain the reference country that minimizes the MSE.
By the end of this procedure, we obtain the different values of γ that minimize the MSE. These
values can be a subset of Γ, so this step can preclude overfitting. Of course, overfitting depends
on the resolution of the proposed set Γ. The larger this set is, the bigger the computational burden.
Here, our strategy is to initially compute the model for every country and every γ ∈ [1, 30] with
a resolution of 117, which is the number of countries in the sample. The upper bound has been
determined by trial an error, after noticing that, for larger γs, the model is unlikely to converge.
Hence, for clarity of exposition, let us denote the set of γs resulting from this method as Γ∗.
Appendix C.2. The ‘jump’ method
This method tries to further reduce the number of distinct values of γ, in order to minimize
overfitting. This is a classic problem in the clustering literature, also known as ‘finding the number
of clusters in a data set’. There are many methods designed for this purpose, and most of them
build on the principle of minimizing the distances within clusters and maximizing the distances
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between them (like the Ward’s method used in section 4.1). By choosing a subset of Γ∗, we seek
to minimize the single-dimensional distance within clusters, i.e. to minimize the MSE. For the
reason, we use the ‘jump’ method developed by Sugar and James [2003].
The jump method builds on information theory and, in particular, on the engineering problem
of optimally coding a continuous signal into a discrete set of symbols. The analogy here is that the
signal is the continuous line [1, 30] which, if estimated with enough resolution, would yield 117
unique values for γ; a clear overfit equivalent to assigning one cluster to each observation. The idea
of the jump method is to find a subset ΓJ ⊂ Γ∗ such that the subsequent marginal contributions of
increasing the subset become relatively small. Sugar and James [2003] show that the true number
of clusters relates to the inverse of the root mean squared error (RMSE). Hence, by computing
MSE−1/2 for all sizes of Γ∗, we can estimate the number of unique values of γ.
There is an additional challenge in this context. A subset ΓJ ⊂ Γ∗ can be arbitrarily defined,
for example, if |Γ∗| = 100 and |ΓJ | = 10 there are
(
100
10
)
ways to determine ΓJ. For this reason, we
sample the space of possible subsets and obtain the best ones by following the next algorithm.
1. Propose a random set Γ′ ⊆ Γ.
2. Obtain Γ∗ ⊆ Γ′ and its size h.
3. If the MSE of Γ∗ is smaller than the ones recorded so far for sets of size h, then Γ∗ is the best
set of size h found so far.
4. Repeat steps 1 to 3 until each one of the sets of sizes 1, . . . , |Γ| have been sampled enough.
5. Once with the best set Γ∗ of each size, compute their corresponding mean squared errors
{MSE1, . . . ,MSEH}.
6. Pick the set Γ∗ such that its size h∗ = argmax{MSE−1/2h −MSE−1/2h−1 }H1 .
The previous algorithm yields the different values of γ that balance error and overfit mini-
mization. To illustrate the outcomes of the entire estimation strategy, Figure C.15 shows the MSE
reduction with more values for γ (top panel), the growth of the inverse RMSE (bottom left panel)
and the biggest jump at 20 distinct values (bottom right panel).
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Figure C.15: Model calibration. Estimations were obtained from over 1 million samples.
Appendix D. Additional sensitivity tests
Appendix D.1. Sensitivity of corruption
Figure D.16 shows the effect of fixing fR,t and fC,t at a constant value (0.5) across countries and
in all periods. The biases with respect to the full model (and the data) are particularly notorious
among low and high corruption countries, as shown in the point-estimates presented in the left
panel. The magnitude of these biases, or course, varies with the value to which fR,t and fC,t are
fixed. In our experience, 0.5 is a conservative specification.
Additionally, the left panel in Figure D.17 shows that fixing fR,t and fC,t distorts slightly the
corruption-performance relationship. Notice that, in contrast to the empirical data, several coun-
tries in cluster 3 and 4 have corruption levels similar or below those simulated for some countries
in cluster 1. Thus, these artificial data are unable to neatly replicate the absence of an overlapping
in corruption levels suggested by the empirical data (see the left panel of Figure 5). Likewise, the
correlation coefficient goes down 6 points with respect to the full model. Consequently, these two
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Figure D.16: The role of supervision and punishment. Model with fixed values fR,t = fC,t = 0.5 for every country and. Left panel: point-estimate
comparison. Right panel: accumulated values of corruption across countries.
variables are not the only factors that help to explain the observed stylized facts.
The right panel in Figure D.17 shows that the effect from removing spillovers on the corruption-
performance relationship is more modest. This, however, does not invalidate the spillovers as an
important mechanism. it only suggests that, it is not relevant to explain this particular stylized fact.
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Figure D.17: Additional tests for internal validation. Left panel: The corruption-performance relationship with fixed fR,t and fC,t . Right panel: The
corruption-performance relationship without network spillovers.
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Appendix E. Non-Trivial Development Footprints
Table E.3: Countries, most feasible targets and trivial targets. Most feasible targets are those with the highest Jaccard index between the estimated
allocation profile and the one needed to reach the target country. Trivial targets are the ones with the highest target-indicator similarity.
Follower Target Trivial Target Follower Target Trivial Target Follower Target Trivial Target
ALB CHL HND GRC QAT QAT NPL ESP GTM
ARG OMN MEX GTM HKG QAT OMN NOR QAT
ARM GRC MAR HND HKG QAT PAK SRB AZE
AZE PRT MAR HRV JPN QAT PAN CHE QAT
BDI SRB NIC HUN QAT QAT PER ARE QAT
BEN DOM NIC IDN QAT QAT PHL SWE QAT
BFA SRB NPL IND ARE MYS POL HKG QAT
BGD CHN GTM ITA USA KOR PRT ISR QAT
BGR OMN HRV JAM FIN QAT PRY ESP HND
BHR ISR QAT JOR DNK QAT RUS CHL CHN
BIH THA HRV KAZ SVN LVA SAU SGP QAT
BOL SAU HND KEN ARM KAZ SEN NIC SRB
BRA AUS QAT KGZ SVN HND SLV ARE QAT
BWA KOR QAT KHM SRB TJK SRB EGY OMN
CHL AUS KOR KWT SWE QAT SVK SGP QAT
CHN DNK QAT LKA HKG QAT SVN KOR KOR
CIV SRB SRB LTU CHE KOR TCD UKR BOL
CMR ECU NIC LVA BEL QAT THA ISR ARE
COL SGP QAT MAR DNK QAT TJK PRT HND
CRI SGP QAT MDG KGZ NIC TTO CAN QAT
CZE AUS KOR MEX ISR QAT TUN QAT QAT
DOM MEX GTM MKD ESP MAR TUR DNK KOR
DZA PRT MAR MLI SRB NIC TZA MKD SRB
ECU CHL HND MNG SVN HND UGA SRB NPL
EGY ARE QAT MOZ KAZ BOL UKR CZE HRV
ESP FIN KOR MRT MKD TJK URY USA QAT
EST USA MYS MUS USA QAT VEN SAU PER
ETH SRB BOL MWI NIC SRB VNM ARG AZE
GEO OMN MAR NAM SGP QAT ZAF ISR NZL
GHA NIC SRB NGA ALB KAZ ZMB SRB NPL
GMB ARM NIC NIC URY HND ZWE ALB VEN
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